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Use Cases
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Pricing
1892
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Challenged that restraint was unlawful.
The exclusion of an alien by an immigration official does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It is an accepted part of international law that all nations have a right to determine which foreigners enter and exit their country. In the United States, this power is explicitly and implicitly given to Congress.
While a foreigner who has been excluded has a right to petition for habeas corpus to determine whether he or she has been lawfully denied entry, a court has no right to controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which an official made his decision. Here, the statute entrusts the final factfinding to the immigration officials.
1903
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The deportation of a foreigner by an immigration official does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Yamataya (plaintiff), a Japanese immigrant, was deported four days after entering the United States, on the ground that she was likely to become a public charge (i.e. dependent on the government for support) and thus was inadmissible at the time she entered the country.
The deportation of a foreigner by an immigration official does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It has been firmly established by this Court that Congress may establish regulations for immigration and deportation, and entrust the enforcement of those regulations to executive officers.
Nevertheless, the power of an executive officer is not absolute, and an official cannot arbitrarily deport a foreigner without giving the foreigner an opportunity to be heard or to answer questions about his or her right to remain in the United States. In this case, however, Yamataya was given an opportunity to ask the immigration official questions about her case. The fact that Yamataya does not speak English does not, without more, make her deportation unconstitutional.
1912
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"Entirely settled" that the "inquiry" concerning admission "may be properly devolved upon an executive department or subordinate officials thereof."
"The appellant raises some other constitutional objections...that the Immigration Act ..violates the constitutional guaranty of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus...These are without substance, and require no discussion."
1950
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Re exclusion: Role for the courts is whether executive followed procedures set down by Congress, not whether procedures are sufficient when applied.
"Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."
Ellen Knauff is the wife of a U.S. citizen under the War Brides Act. AG "finds" that admitting her would be prejudicial to interests of U.S. and excludes her without a hearing. Govt won't say why; claims exclusion based on confidential information, disclosure of which "would be prejudicial to the public interest." Govt also says giving her a hearing would be prejudicial to the public interest.
1952
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"The power to expel aliens...may be exercised entirely through executive officers, 'with such opportunity for judicial review of their action as Congress may see fit to authorize or permit."
1953
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A lawful permanent resident, who departs from and returns to the country as a seaman on an American ship, retains procedural due process rights and cannot be deported under 8 CFR § 175.57(b) without a hearing.
Kwong Hai Chew was a Chinese seaman who was admitted to the United States in 1945. He married a U.S. citizen, resided in New York, and obtained a suspension of deportation after proving his good moral character for the preceding five years. In 1949, he was admitted to permanent residence in the United States as of January 10, 1945.
Chew served with credit in the United States Merchant Marine in World War II and never had difficulty with governmental authorities.
1953
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The government may exclude an alien from entering the country without a hearing or public justification, even if that alien has previously resided in the United States for a long period of time. Only resident aliens and United States citizens are entitled to due process as required by the Constitution. The courts therefore cannot review the determination of the Attorney General because Mezei is only entitled to the procedures authorized by Congress, which allow the Attorney General to permanently exclude aliens without a hearing. The fact that he has not been able to enter another country does not grant him greater rights than that of any other alien being excluded from entry.
Facts: Mezei stranded on Ellis Island. Excluded from U.S. on security grounds but other countries would not take him back. Mezei had lived in Buffalo, NY for 25 years; had a family there. Visited Romania to see his dying mother and stayed there for 19 months.
o Unlike Knauff, Mezei can't just go back to his country.
• Court: standing on Ellis Island does not equal "entry" for purposes of deportation/exclusion determination.
• Protracted absence, unlike Chew, negated Mezei's constitutional DPC right to a hearing upon return.
1976
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Whether an administrative procedure meets the constitutional guarantees of the Due Process Clause requires a consideration of three factors:
(1) the private interest at stake in the administrative action;
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of this interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
(3) the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.
1982
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In an exclusion proceeding, a permanent resident alien is entitled to procedural due process of the law.
Extends protections to returning LPRs by constiutuionalizing Chew. Does so by saying as they build ties, more constitutional protections.
In an exclusion proceeding, a permanent resident alien is entitled to procedural due process of the law.
Plasencia is a LPR. Married to U.S. citizen. Travels to Mexico for 3-4 days, and assists six individuals trying to EWI. Gets caught at the border. Judge at her exclusion hearing says that under INA, she can be excluded. (Rather than deported.)
• Plasencia argues she's more like Chew than Knauff or Mezei. Argues she should be put in deportation proceedings, not exclusion proceedings. (Deportation proceedings less favorable to government.)
• Fleuti doctrine: If a person leaves country and departure is "brief, casual, and innocent," it's not a departure. And if it's not a departure, your return isn't an "entry."
o Fleuti doctrine arises because of harsh consequences of Mezei for LPRs who leave and return.
Reasoning: This court has long held that permanent resident aliens are accorded more constitutional rights than aliens seeking entry into the country for the first time. These rights include the right to due process at deportation or exclusion proceedings. While resident aliens who leave the country for extended periods of time may lose these rights, Plasencia was only gone for a few days. The requirements of due process vary based on the situation and the interest of both parties. Plasencia's interest is high, as she might lose her right to live with her family in their native country. The government's interest in securing its borders is also high.
2001
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You can't suspend habeas by stripping federal courts of jurisdiction of challenges to removal orders.
Construes '96 amendments to leave open habeas review in District Courts, at least to consider pure Qs of law. AEDPA and IIRIRA did not strip the federal courts of their jurisdiction over the habeas corpus applications of deportable aliens. There is a longstanding presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative decisions. Congress must also show a clear intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction. A statute that prohibits judicial review of a question of law by any court raises constitutional issues based on the Suspension Clause and should be construed, if possible, in a way that is constitutional. Habeas relief has been historically applied in cases where a detainee's claim was based on an alleged error of law or statutory application. Habeas corpus has also been historically used extensively in the immigration context and the context of discretionary relief. Therefore, even if the Suspension Clause only refers to habeas corpus as it was used when the constitution was drafted, the statutes in question in this case still raise constitutional issues. Congress did not clearly intend to repeal habeas jurisdiction when it enacted AEDPA and IIRIRA.
2006
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President did not have the authority to try detainees by military commission without specific Congressional authorization, and that the system established by the President violated the requirements of the Geneva Conventions.
2008
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Stated that "the laws and constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, in extraordinary times," and that terrorism suspects held at Guantanamo Bay have the constitutional rights to challenge their detentions in court.
The Suspension Clause explicitly limits suspension of the writ of habeas corpus to times of "rebellion or invasion." 3 Given the historical importance of habeas corpus as a linchpin of liberty, the Court asked whether it was "impractical or anomalous" for this Constitutional.
2008
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Habeas corpus statute extends to American citizens held overseas by American forces operating subject to an American chain of command, even when those forces are acting as part of a multinational coalition; however, petitioners state no claim in their habeas petitions for which relief can be granted.
2016
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