Commerce Clause

Production quotas under the Agricultural Adjustment Act were constitutionally applied to agricultural production that was consumed purely intrastate, because its effect upon interstate commerce placed it within the power of Congress to regulate under the Commerce Clause. Southern District of Ohio reversed.

Congress did not unconstitutionally exceed its powers under the Commerce Clause by enacting Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibited racial discrimination in public accommodations. Northern District of Georgia affirmed.

Section 201(a), (b), and (c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964[1] which forbids discrimination by restaurants offering to serve interstate travelers or serving food that has moved in interstate commerce is a constitutional exercise of the commerce power of Congress.

FLSA as applied to state employers was unconstitutional as a violation of Amendment X of the Constitution.

Congress had the authority under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution to apply the Fair Labor Standards Act to a municipal mass transit system operated by a governmental entity. District Court for the Western District of Texas reversed.

Possession of a gun near school is not an economic activity that has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. A law prohibiting guns near schools is a criminal statute that does not relate to commerce or any sort of economic activity.

The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act's interim provision commanding the "chief law enforcement officer" (CLEO) of each local jurisdiction to conduct background checks, §922(s)(2), is unconstitutional.

The DPPA did not run afoul of the federalism principles enunciated in New York v. United States and Printz v. United States, and was a valid exercise of Congress' power under the Commerce Clause.

The Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981, is unconstitutional as exceeding congressional power under the Commerce Clause and under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.