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Use Cases
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Resources
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Pricing
october 1944
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4 february 1945 - 11 february 1945
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U.S. goals:
-to take SU into war against Japan
-to get SU's approval for UN
-"declaration on liberated Europe" was to controll SU's spread (Stalin believed that communists will continue to be in power in Ea.Eu. as they made success)
SU's goals
-to guarantee destruction of Germany (SU&US were equal at the moment of conference, only after US used bomb in Japan - so, G. could be stopped only through common ways of making war)
-there was a non agression agreement between SU&Japan, St. wanted back territories of Tsarist Russia and control of the railway
Points of Conference:
-Germany (it was agreed to invite France to take over an area of occupation)
-Poland&Yugoslavia were treated equally (neccessity of representative government - temporary government to include liberal democrats from 2 London governments in exile)
-Declaration on liberated Europe
-SU against Japan
Roosvelt was alive(mutual trust between R.&St.), lvl of trust was greater then later,Yalta agreement did not create an iron curtain, but spheres of influence (+% agreement before)
February (date of conference) - on battlefields UK&US were stopped by very victorious defense of nazis, at the same time, Red army made great success&moved fast. So for Churchill it was very important to include SU - to maintain peace. (?)
11 february 1945
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september 1947 - april 1956
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As a response to Marshall Plan
Purpose - to organize Cold War Communism in Europe (and only in Europe)
Was dissolved after Soviet rapprochement with Yugoslavia and the process of De-Stalinization.
september 1947
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Insisted on mimicing the CP of the SU, need of uniformity of Soviet Camp.
Language og beseiged fortress, isolation - repetition of 30's policy, just now it is not SU, but Soviet Camp.
Only 5 years after Stalin's speech where he spoke about UK&US as democratic friends. Now in Zhdanov speech - radical change, they are imperialists.
St's approach is still very traditional - territories as a defense (security) of SU (because it was before atomic bomb)
1948
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Social democratic parties were forcibly merged with Communist Parties
25 february 1948
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Orchestrated by SU
Spurred Republican Congress to pass the legislation to implement the Marshal plan
24 june 1948 - 5 may 1949
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-in april 1949 NATO was formed
-US officials decided that it was more important to link Allied-controlled Germany to the West than to unify the whole country
-in 1946 Soviets stopped delivering food to W.Germ.>US stopped shipping industrial equipment Ea.Germ
-local elections in 1946 in Berlin showed anti-comm. results
-in document Soviets concentrate on violation of agreed measures
-SU wanted not only mainain G. weak, but radically transform the social system (de-nazification)
-Reparations were to maintain G. weak (West feared that huge reparations to Msc&control of Ruhr can over time lead to absolute control of the country by Communists)
-UK&USA&SU didn't come to any agreement about Pol&Germ border
-All this created mutual distrust
-US wanted to unify western zones and to recover G. (it was perceived as a threat by SU)
-in spring 1948 Western Powers succeded in merging of their zones
-so SU reacted on it, because agreement was to withdraw other troops from soviet territory (Berlin was deep in soviet territory)
1 april 1948 - SU imposed travel restictions on Allied personnel
24 june 1948 in Western territory - currence reform>SU closed all roads&links
-during spring SU tried to persuade Fr. to oppose UK&US plans for Germany (based on Fr's fears of German militarism)
-UK&US provided airlifting supply
-non-nuclear SU had to avoid military confromtation with US
-Stalin in fact provided the rationale for western rearmament (unintendedly)
-8 april 1949 UK&US&FR announced agreement on establishment of FRG
-5 may - end of blockade
-august soviet atomic bomb success
28 june 1948
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1st rupture within socialist camp - new for foreign policy of SU. Before it was cocerned about 1.US&Wesr; 2.Asia.
Silence is speaking - in document there is nothing about Balkan Federation.
BF - Dimitrov went to Buharest, met leaders of Romania. Press-conference - anounced the talks of Tito&Dimitrov (9 projects of BF during the war) and that BF will come soon.
Greece was included in project - St. was furious, he wanted to preserve % agreement with Churchill. St. saw in Greece an obstacle for cooperation with West, so he didn't support greek civil war
Hung., Cz-Sl., Pol - were mentioned as possible memebers of BF in future.
Dimitrov stated that they will not ask anybody's advice.
St. needed to force other CP in EaEu to believe in Zhdanov speech (autonomus foreign policy was not allowed), so he identified the traitor and pushed for homogenization of Socialist Camp.
So Tito had its own foreign policy.
St. wanted to preserve ideological legitimacy of SU in the whole Socialist Camp. - St. opressed lots of people in EaEu because they had local support&had legitimacy on local territory - it was against St's ideas.
St. new that SU is not prepared for a new war. Dimitrov, Tito&Bauer were not aware of it. This split was not expected.
Split with Tito - like a real "iron curtain" because other countries had no power after to oppose SU's policy and became satelites.
5 january 1949 - 28 june 1991
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As an alternative to European Economic Community (EEC)
july 1949
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August 1949
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october 1949
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january 1950
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1950
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14 february 1950
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-St. tied Chinese into unequal economic relations
-Sino-Soviet Treaty of millitary alliance - US saw it as threat of comm expansion
-1st meeting of two leaders, they were very cautious how to control each other
-St. still felt connected to Chan Kaishek (deal with him in 1945), so difficult.
-Mao could be a second Tito, he spoke somehow alike as ideas of peoples' democracies in Europe.
-1 month befor Mao took control of Beijing - SU tested atomic bomb
-consultations for any problem between M&St. (Mao wanted to participate in discussions of international q-ns)
-St. obstained from Mao's intensions in Taiwan - not to provoke US&UK to intervene
-St. was suspicious of the chinese communists as they relied less on tiny working class in China, and moe on the peasantry.
25 june 1950 - 27 july 1953
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in 1943 Cairo meeting - Korea was promsed independence BUT 38th parallel -SU north;US south.
in jan 1949 - withdrawal of soviet troops, few months later - US also.
in summer 1950 north invaded south
*until 90's soviet version - it was a response on a provocation by the south
-Msc was excluded from settlement of the Japanese q-n>so if north korea wins, St. gained influence in the region.
-St. tried to avoid direct confrontation with US.
-St. provided arms and sent advisers.
-Kim il Sung reassured St. that invasion could be achieved quickly and without opposition of the US.
-US made 2 puplic speeches, where clearly showed lack of interest in northern korea>that's why St. decided to enter the korean war and accept the risk
-for US, Truman's administration thought that Europeans could see that korean problem was a Kremlin attempt to probe americans resolve glovbally.
-for Mao it was a threat to have US (in southern korea) so close - that's why Mao wanted to continue the war
-for West - China stimulated fear of Communist expansion in the region
-SU was absent on UNSC when the decision was taken about Korean War. Absent because there was a representative of ChanKaishek and not Mao's (SU requested change but it was not applied by other members). (Iraqi&Kosovo were not authorized by UNSC by Russia's veto)
-Kim Il Sung didn't follow St's order, bcause Mao was determined to fight>shows limits of St's influence, and Mao's more influential.
-SU had to face that western alliance remained united over korean conflict and moved towards a coherent military-political unit in Western Europe.
-AFTER Korean war we may talk of a GLOBAL Cold War confrontation (no only East vs. West)
18 April 1951
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signed in 18 April 1951
in force from 23 July 1952
1952
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St. stated - while war is inevitable between capitalists, SU can avoid involvement and preserve peace
march 1953
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June 1953
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Beria (Soviet-German policy) He was the most openminded from "troika"
-attempted to prevent GDR from blocking itself off unification. Main point for SU - how to make G. unable to present risk for SU? > 1.reduce industrial capacity + 2.demilitarise
(as soviet proposal of G. unification failed - it made it possible in future to include W. Germany into NATO)
-irdered a relaxation of regime>it led to workers uprisings
-in 22 august GDR was fully integrated into Eastern Block (agreement with Moscow)
13 september 1953 - 14 october 1964
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Tensions in troika - how to legitimise the new power after St. death?
Khr appeals to Lenin - in order to legitimise new power and separate from Stalin.
Khr had to find a strong legitimisation of power - for this he needed Tito, to use him in the battle of the party
After St's death - multipolarity in Soviet leadership, so different ways to treat foreign policy
+ need to negotiate within the party
Context of perceived weakness (shaped foreign policy):
-within Europe
-Yugo&China as competing ways
-Berlin uprising (workers uprised)
*Coexistence is useful for connecting foreign&domestic policies (ex. appologises in yugo>put under revision of all trials before)
-1952 with St. alive - 1st proposal of German unification, it included free elections; 1954-no, because of Berlin uprising in 1953. West was insisting on free elections.
-Soviet proposal of Eu. security was excluding of Us, so it was rejected. SU even was ready to bargain - offered help to France in Indo-China if it rejects other security proposals.
5 May 1955
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-full sovereignty of West Germany
-ending of its occupation
-its admittance to NATO
It was ratified after London and Paris Conferences (before was idea to include W.Germany into EDC (EuDefCom) but EDC failed with France failure to ratify it)
14 may 1955 - 1 july 1991
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-Qualitative change:
-multilateral regular meetings were established
-formalized military relations between Msc&EaEuCs
-provided to Msc justification for stationing troops
-ParisTreaties&WTO > secured spheres of influence
-WTO was sighned 1 day after Khr. withdrew troops from Austria - troops were sent to Hungary, as now WTO justified their presence.
15 may 1955
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-Neutrality and end of four-power occupation
-Khr. wanted to make clear what he wanted to do with Germany
-Khr withdrew troops from Austria - again to show his same intentions for Germany
27 may 1955
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-the same year of WTO, right after its establishment
-appologises
-makes a lot of references to Lenin
-blames Beria&Abakumov
-seems not opposing Yugo to have relations with the West
-by accepting Yugo as a socialist country different roads to socialism were possible again
-Tito took an independent position on Hungarian uprising - it led to new break
february 1956
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2 parts:
1. peaceful coexistence
2. national road to socialism
-non-violent path to socialism, reflecting conditions and traditions of countries
-refers to Lenin: "socialism is inevitable but not all will do so in exactly the same way"
-deeply influenced by Yugoslavia (this doc+secret speech). national roads - to justify Yugo, to bring Tito back to the Camp
-Peaceful coex was not in Mao's view, but Khr. mentioned China. China was not able to continue this polocy (started from Bangu conferencse in 1955)
-Mao influenced a lot on Khr. Mao was not afraid of nuclear war - chinese are so many that they will survive. Here appears mistrust between M&Khr. Mao condamned Khr. in inability to implement his "peaceful coex" with Tito.
-1953-54 Comission was already workin. Idea was to create a strong system by appologising the prisoners. But Mao wanted to maintain power through rigid policies. So Khr. - opposite - to go back to origins, more flexible.
25 february 1956
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-condemn St's cult of personality
-contrast St & Lenin
->disunity of party
-St's positive role in ideological fight in late 20's
-secret speech was the way how to detatch Stalin from Lenin
-Khr. wanted to legitimise himself throught appealing to Tito. BUT Tito understood that he could lead now - huge misunderstanding.
june 1956
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Gomulka became 1st secretary of party
No invasion
23 october 1956 - 10 november 1956
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communists had a strong resistance of Catholic church
+ collectivisation>hunger in 1953
-Kadar instead of Nagy (it was Tito's demant - to prove Khr's "national roads")
-Here were only Soveit troops (not Warsaw Pact troops, as in 68 in Prague)
-Khr. went to Yugo to convince Tito to support intervention to Hungary. Khr. accepted Kadar as Tito's candidate in turn of Tito's not intervention into Hungarian affair.
-Nagy went to Yugo's ambassy to find political asylum>state problem between Yugo&SU.
-Nagy went out of ambassy and was captured by KGB>Tito condemned Khr. in opposing his own ideas of peaceful coex.>condemned SU in Hungarian invasion>Khr. failed in his attempts as he lost his "puppet"
november 1957
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Khr. felt stronger after failed coup against him.
He tried to reestablish relations with Tito again, but again the same misunderstanding appeared.
Khr. discussed with Tito 40 days on Danube river the issue how to bring Yugo&SU closer to each other, but then Tito decided not to come to conference and not to sign the paper - Khr. was furious. After this failure, Yugo will never be so close (as in 1956) to SU again until Gorbachev.
August 1961
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14 october 1962 - 28 october 1962
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creation of "hot line"
final acceptance of spheres of influence
1963
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SU started to buy grain from capitalists
14 october 1964 - 10 november 1982
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-Strategic parity with US achieved in early 70's > arms-control agreements from a "position of strength"
-60's-70's crusial for 3rd world - independency
-In 3rd World - shift from economic to military aid (zero sum game in the end)
-70's economic growth rates bagan to decline in Communist camp (lag in technology also)
-In Afganistan, Soviet military, economic and technological shortcomings bacame evident
20 august 1968 - 20 september 1968
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As a Warsaw Pact forces
1969
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1966 chenese launched Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution
12 august 1970
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The Moscow Treaty
August 1971
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1 august 1975
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12 december 1979
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11 march 1985 - 24 august 1991
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-"young" politician, education in law, not from periphery
-rejected the use of forse
-wanted to change within SU framework
-economic reforms
-was deeply influenced by invasion of Cz-Sl.
-Czech reformer,Zdenek Mlynar-students with Gorbachev at MGU in 50-55
-"European home" as a rethoric, shared values.
1986
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1986
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Gorbacev's shift from the Doctrine of "class struggle"
on 27th Party Congress
october 1986
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-Opened an unprecedented discussion of complete nuclear disarmament
-events after this reflected choices not about whether to end the C.War, but about how to end it
8 december 1987
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US&SU - eliminated the medium.range missiles in Europe (entire class of weapons)(that had contributed so much to Ea-We tension since the late 70's)
7 december 1988
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-international relations should be free from ideology (shift from ideological struggle to common values of humanity)
-cut 500k soldiers from Soviet Army
-reduce of 50k men and 5k tanks from EaEu
1989 - 1991
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Tbilisi 9 april 1989
Baku 19 january 1990
13 january 1991 Vilnius
These military crackdowns increased nationalist fervor in Soviet Republics. More radical and popular within Georgia,Azerb,Lith.
25 october 1989
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stated by Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov on american tv programe
1990 - october 1993
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-it was a permanent parliament
-was abolished in October 1993 (after the events of Russia's 1993 constitutional crisis) and replaced by the Federal Assembly of Russia (consists of the Federation Council of Russia and State Duma), whose powers are weaker than Supreme Soviet ones
-abolition made russian diplomacy to act more independently in international relations without parliamentary control
november 1990
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eliminated many of the military structures that had long devided Ea&W
december 1990
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-US&SU It laid the foundation to significant cut in the conventional forces in Europe
-"race to disarm"
1991
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reduced nucler arcenal:
-american 25%
-soviet 30%
12 june 1991
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59% to Yelzin
19 august 1991 - 21 AUGUST 1991
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failed because of popular opposition on the streets as well as within military + Yelzin resistance
25 december 1991
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1992
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12 december 1993
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Yeltsin managed to push through his new constitution, creating a strong presidency and giving the president sweeping powers to issue decrees
-The premier, for example, is appointed, and in effect freely dismissed, by the president
-Adoption of rethoric of nationalism
14 august 1941
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-no territorial aggrandizement; no territorial changes made against the wishes of the people; restoration of self-government to those deprived of it; reduction of trade restrictions; global cooperation to secure better economic and social conditions for all; freedom from fear and want; freedom of the seas; and abandonment of the use of force, as well as disarmament of aggressor nations.
-in the "Declaration by United Nations" of 1 January 1942, the Allies of World War II pledged adherence to this charter's principles.
-it set goals for the post-war world and inspired many of the international agreements that shaped the world thereafter.
-the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the post-war independence of European colonies, and much more are derived from the Atlantic Charter
*despite the fact that US yet are not involved in war
28 november 1943 - 1 december 1943
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-to open 2nd front
1945 - 1953
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16 July 1945
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August 6 and 9, 1945
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan
17 july 1945 - 2 august 1945
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SU was dissapointed with reparations
5 march 1946
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1947 - 1967
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Denial of all goods that might be adapted for weapons (from U.S. to S.U.)
+ list of emargoed goods by Western Europe
1947
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12 march 1947
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UK was not able to continue subsidising its army in Greece, so they asked US to help.
5 june 1947
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Europen Recovery Program (ERP) lasted 4 years
During Roosevelt it was elaborated differently, ans SU even was thinking to support it.
4 april 1949 - 04/16/2014
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1950
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14 april 1950
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Containment policy as a priority for U.S.
Rollback policy
april 1951
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for the spread and propaganda - undercutting Soviet power in Eastern Europe
20 january 1953 - 20 january 1961
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29 october 1956 - 7 november 1956
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December 1956 - 30 april 1979
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Decision to Bomb North Vietnam in feb 1965
23 november 1959
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"Yes, it is Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, it is the whole of Europe, that will decide the destiny of the world"
His vision stood in contrast to the Atlanticism of the United States and Britain, preferring instead a Europe that would act as a third pole between the United States and the Soviet Union. By including in his ideal of Europe all the territory up to the Urals, de Gaulle was implicitly offering détente to the Soviets.
1961
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20 january 1961 - 22 november 1963
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April 1961
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5 august 1963
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US, UK, SU
in order to contain Germany and China
22 november 1963 - 20 january 1969
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1966-68 > detentr policy
1964
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1966 - tested a ballistic missile
1968
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Negotiations were opened by SU and US
In force from 1970
1969 - 1974
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Willy Brandt in W.Germany
accepted borders of Polan and EaGermany
1.accepting the status quo of powers
2.removed soviet argument about german danger
3.improved Ea-W relations
-W.Germany remains since that time in a cooperative framework with East
-made CSCE and Helsinki process - possible
(when Soviet accepted the US role in Europe and W.Germans accepted the status quo > foundation for all-European security conference)
-NATO and the West(Fr.) were afraid of W.Germany moving eastwards, they tried to connect W.Germany by all means to the West.
20 january 1969 - 9 august 1974
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with Kissinger
to disentangle from Vietnam
China card - to split the communist block
Underestimating local circumstances of 3rd World
Tend to slow down the presence in 3rd World
7 december 1970
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accepted the existing border—the Oder-Neisse line, imposed on Germany by the Allied powers at the 1945 Potsdam Conference
1971
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(no more $ conversation into gold)
-because i was a big inflation
-this step allowed to export inflation into Europe (Fr. was furious)
So fear was created in Europe that US will not lead a free world
26 may 1972
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Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
Nixon & Brezhnev
3 june 1972
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accepting the status quo
21 December 1972
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1973
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1973
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part of Arab-Israel conflicts
-Both US and SU didn't want to allow each other's presence in the Middle East
-one of the highest tensions of the Cold War
9 august 1974 - 20 january 1977
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20 january 1977 - 20 january 1981
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-undercut secretive diplomacy practiced by Nixon and Kissinger
-appointed anti-communist Brzezinski as a national security adviser
-an extreme supporter of human rights
1978
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???
12 december 1979
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SU - Afghanistan on the same day
20 january 1981 - 20 january 1989
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-anti-communist "crusade"
-largest defense buildup since Korean War
-1st application to religion - SU as "emperial evil"
-much more assertive foreign policy - to help everybody against communism (support Afgan., Kambogia, Nikaragua, Ethiopia)
-Huge investmet, adding 35% of exp. in military, now with a clear enemy
-Deployment of missiles into Europe
-launching SDI, this idea was never abandoned, now it is not "national" but missile defense because it spreads for Europe.
-charismatic leader
1983 - peak of tensions
1983
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8 march 1983
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23 march 1983
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"Star wars"
-space-based missile defense program that could protect the country from a large-scale nuclear attack
-violation of the 1972 Antiballistic Missile
-SU might feel forced to attack before the US could complete the system
2 november 1983 - 11 november 1983
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Hightened alert of Warsaw Pact forces, as Soviet observers believed it might be a real thing
16 january 1984
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Crucial shift in rethoric.
He called for constructive cooperation, to avoid war and reduce lvls of arms
17 december 1984
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I like Mr Gorbachev. We can do business together
(in interview to BBC)
november 1985
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-Rea&Gor improvement of relations
-only 6 moths after Chernenko's death (before the internal leadership situation could not effectively "react" on Reagan's shift towards)
1989
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-the "standard" reform package promoted for crisis-wracked developing countries
-policies in such areas as macroeconomic stabilization, economic opening with respect to both trade and investment, and the expansion of market forces within the domestic economy.
20 january 1989 - 20 january 1993
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-Uruguay round of GATT > WTO
-NAFTA negotiations
june 1989
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Showed opposite to Marxist theory - possibility of a peaceful transition from one system to another
4 june 1989
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brutal use of force
10 september 1989
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It opened a way for EaGerman refugees
made the Berlin Wall pointless 2 months before it was opened up
november 1989
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28 November 1989
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thought they will be lucku to achieve unification "with 5 or 10 years", but it was very fast, as germans were highly willing to unite
june 1990
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Bush convinced G. to agree that unined Germany should decide for itself in which alliance she would like to participate
In return - Bush sighned an agreement eliminating most of the Cold War restrictions on the Soviet trade
3 october 1990
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Same day - member of NATO
Reagan reassured Gorbachev that NATO itself would not go further
Without US backing the unification of Germany would not appear
20 january 1993 - 20 january 2001
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Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti (?)
More forceful in supportin democracy-seeking states fighting from a communict Yugoslav federation (in contrast to Bush)
1 january 1994
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agreement officially came into force
North American Free Trade Agreement
1 january 1995
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with Russia
WTO marked a major step in establishing a judicial basis for international trade law
2001
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As an emerging norm that sovereignty is not a right, but that states must protect their populations from mass atrocity crimes—namely genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing.
-state has a responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.
-the international community has a responsibility to assist the state to fulfill its primary responsibility.
-if the state manifestly fails to protect its citizens from the four above mass atrocities and peaceful measures have failed, the international community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive measures such as economic sanctions. Military intervention is considered the last resort.
-R2P is a norm and not a law
-International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report in 2001
-Criticisms: ‘humanitarian interventions’, which often conceal the true strategic motives
april 1990
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created, like in russia, conditions for rule by one person - president
in 1992 - another constitution
december 1990
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Serbia was the last among former republics to have free elections
31 March 1991 - 2 November 1995
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25 June 1991
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27 June 1991 - 7 July 1991
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between the Slovenian Territorial Defence and the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA)
7 July 1991
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8 september 1991
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Same day of referendum
15 January 1992
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By European Economic Community
United Nations did so in May 1992
Recognition started by Ukraine and Latvia, then germany - in december 1991
february 1992 - march 1995
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US agreed to participate in it
1 march 1992
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Declaration of independence (?)
Recognition (?)
7 april 1992
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27 april 1992 - 3 june 2006
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-Serbia and Montenegro
-gained UN membership on 2 November 2000
July 1993
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In december additional forces were added to UN peace-keeping
september 1993
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-american soldiers were killed and wounded
-made clear that American ground troop deployments were virtually impossible in Bosnia, it ensured that no serious UN pease-keeping force could be fielded to support an overall Bosnian settlement
-White House turned its attention to problems closer to home: Haiti, Cuba, Mexico and domestic politics
14 December 1995
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acceptance of war results
23 July 1997 - 5 October 2000
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before he was a President of Serbia (11 January 1991 – 23 July 1997)
-he needed to find new legitimation of power - nationalism
-he abolished autonomy of Kosovo&Vojevodina
-was willing to keep Yugo united
24 march 1999 - 10 june 1999
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-during the Kosovo War
-the operation was not authorised by the United Nations and was the first time that NATO used military force without the approval of the UN Security Council and against a sovereign nation that did not pose a threat to members of the alliance
3 June 2006
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5 June 2006
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