In pg. 451 of Maloney's PE book, she says, "The Clinton track record in this regard is extensive, even outside the energy sector; Washington undermined Iranian efforts to reschedule debts, blocked loans by the World Bank and international monetary fund, reversed Japanese plans for several hundred million dollar id project in southern Iran, swayed Moscow to restrict its arms sales to defensive weaponry, and otherwise increased the costs and inconvenience to the Iranian economy at a time when Iran was still struggling to recover from the war and the aftereffects of the revolutionary turmoil and mismanagement."
It is not cited. Probably should read Parsi, Pollack, and Slavin to understand exactly what she means had happened during the Clinton Administration.
"Iran's central bank governor went on the record asserting that American companies has exported $1 billion Iranian goods and suggested that US efforts to persuade Europe to join the embargo were a competitive move aimed at elimination rivals for the Iranian marketplace."
Source: Maloney Political Economy Pg. 450
-She cited a Dow Jones article
-The announcement is ostensibly January 12, 1994 as that is when the Dow Jones article is cited
(Wiki) On 14 August 2002, Alireza Jafarzadeh, a spokesman for an Iranian dissident group National Council of Resistance of Iran, publicly revealed the existence of two nuclear sites under construction: a uranium enrichment facility in Natanz (part of which is underground), and a heavy water facility in Arak. It has been strongly suggested that intelligence agencies already knew about these facilities but the reports had been classified.
Russian technicians began to assemble heavy equipment in the Bushehr reactor, despite U.S. attempts to convince the Russians not to participate. But the plant faced frequent delays in construction.
President Khatami said Iran had discovered and extracted uranium in the Savand area. He cited Iran’s “legitimate right to obtain nuclear energy for peaceful aims” and expressed readiness to accept international inspections of its nuclear activities.
Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization presented the United Nations with a sketch of Iran's nuclear program, insisting that the program was peaceful.
Tehran backed a proposal by Syria to rid the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction.
An IAEA report did not find Iran in violation of the NPT but said Iran should have been more forthcoming about the Natanz uranium enrichment facility and the Arak heavy water production plant. The U.N. watchdog agency later urged Iran to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which would allow inspectors more access to nuclear sites and the right to sudden inspections.
IAEA inspectors found traces of highly enriched uranium at Iran's Natanz nuclear plant. Iran claimed the traces came from equipment imported from another country.
(USIP) U.N. weapons inspectors found traces of highly enriched weapons-grade uranium at a second site near the capital city of Tehran. The IAEA set a deadline of Oct. 31 for Iran to prove it was not making nuclear weapons.
The finding, the result of environmental sampling at the Kalaye Electric Company plant, further ratcheted up pressure on Iran, which earlier this month was given until Oct. 31 to prove that its nuclear program is intended solely for peaceful purposes.
The IAEA concluded there was no evidence of a secret nuclear weapons program in Iran but showed concern about its production of plutonium. President Khatami said that the plutonium was used for manufacturing pharmaceuticals and the small amount produced by Iran could not make a nuclear bomb.
France, Germany and the United Kingdom (the EU-3) undertook a diplomatic initiative with Iran to resolve questions about its nuclear program. On 21 October 2003, in Tehran, the Iranian government and EU-3 Foreign Ministers issued a statement known as the Tehran Declaration in which Iran agreed to co-operate with the IAEA, to sign and implement an Additional Protocol as a voluntary, confidence-building measure, and to suspend its enrichment and reprocessing activities during the course of the negotiations. The EU-3 in return explicitly agreed to recognize Iran's nuclear rights and to discuss ways Iran could provide "satisfactory assurances" regarding its nuclear power program, after which Iran would gain easier access to modern technology. Iran signed an Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003, and agreed to act as if the protocol were in force, making the required reports to the IAEA and allowing the required access by IAEA inspectors, pending Iran's ratification of the Additional Protocol.
Iran acknowledged having secretly bought nuclear parts from international sources, although Tehran continued to insist that its goal was electricity production and not nuclear weapons.
Iran declared its plans to construct a heavy water reactor to produce radioisotopes for medical research. Western envoys warned that the facility could reprocess the spent fuel rods to produce plutonium.
In negotiations with Britain, France and Germany, Iran accepted the Paris accord, which recognized Tehran's rights to pursue nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and reaffirmed Iran's commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. In exchange, Iran voluntarily agreed to temporarily suspend uranium enrichment activities and allow the IAEA to monitor the suspension.
The IAEA reported that it had not found any evidence that Iran had tried to develop nuclear weapons, although it could not rule out the existence of nuclear materials that had not been declared.
Iran invited the IAEA to monitor the suspension of all enrichment-related activities.
Iran said that it had not abandoned its right to enrich uranium and that the suspension was only temporary. European officials hoped to make the suspension permanent in return for trade deals and other incentives.
Iran’s intelligence minister announced the arrest of more than 10 people on spying charges. Tehran charged the spies were passing sensitive information on Iran’s nuclear program to the Israeli Mossad and the CIA.
IAEA inspectors were only allowed partial access to the Parchin military base near Tehran. Under the NPT, Iran was not required to allow inspectors into its military bases. But the Bush administration consistently expressed concern that Iran’s failure to allow full access to its suspected military bases and facilities was linked to a secret nuclear weapons program.
All options on the table
President Bush said military action against Iran remained an option, "if it continues to stonewall the international community about the existence of its nuclear weapons program."
Iran's Minister of Defense Ali Shamkhani said in an interview that it was not in Iran's national interest to acquire nuclear weapons.
Tehran and Moscow signed an agreement that stipulated that Russia would supply nuclear fuel for the Bushehr facility and that Iran would return all spent fuel rods to Russia to ensure the fuel was not diverted for other use.
Iran’s parliament approved a non-binding resolution urging the government to resume uranium enrichment for peaceful use.
Iran informed the IAEA that it had decided to resume activities at the Isfahan uranium conversion center. The U.N. nuclear watchdog agency urged Iran not to take any action that would prejudice negotiations with Britain, France and Germany (the EU-3) or undermine the IAEA inspection process.
Britain, France and Germany (the EU-3) proposed the “Framework for a Long-term Agreement” to Iran. The deal offered assistance in developing peaceful nuclear energy in exchange for a binding commitment that Iran would not to pursue fuel cycle activities other than for light water power and research reactors. It also called for a halt on construction of a heavy water research reactor at Arak. Iran rejected the proposal, as it required Tehran to abandon all nuclear fuel work.
Iran resumed uranium conversion at the Isfahan facility under surveillance of the IAEA.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding the “production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons.”
The IAEA urged Iran to suspend all enrichment activities and re-instate IAEA seals.
The IAEA adopts a resolution finding Iran in noncompliance with its safeguards agreement by a vote of 22-1 with 12 members abstaining. The resolution says that the nature of Iran’s nuclear activities and the lack of assurance in their peaceful nature fall under the purview of the UN Security Council, paving the way for a future referral.
Iran’s parliament approved a bill requiring the government to stop voluntary implementation of the Safeguards Agreement’s separate Additional Protocol, which allowed more intrusive and surprise inspections, if Iran were referred to the Security Council. The parliament did not move to block normal inspections required under the Safeguards Agreement, which had been ratified by parliament in 1974.
Iran broke open internationally monitored seals on the Natanz enrichment facility and at two related storage and testing locations, which cleared the way to resume nuclear fuel research under IAEA supervision.
The IAEA voted to report Iran to the U.N. Security Council for its non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement obligations.
The U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1696 demanding that Iran suspend its uranium enrichment activities within one month. No sanctions were imposed but the resolution warned that "appropriate measures" would be taken in the case of Iranian non-compliance. Tehran called the resolution illegal.
Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad inaugurated a heavy water production plant at Arak. The United States expressed concern that the heavy water would be used in the heavy water reactor at Arak to produce plutonium, an ingredient in making nuclear weapons.
President Bush signed into law the Iran Freedom Support Act, which imposed economic sanctions on nations and companies that aided Iran's nuclear program.
The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1737, sanctioning Iran for its failure to comply with Resolution 1696 and halt uranium enrichment. The resolution banned the sale of nuclear-related technology to Iran and froze the assets of key individuals and companies related to the nuclear program.
The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1747, which banned the sale of arms to Iran increased the freeze on assets.
A U.S. National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear activities said there was evidence that Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003. It assessed with “moderate confidence” that Iran had not re-started its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007. The findings contradicted the 2005 U.S. intelligence assessment that Tehran was seeking nuclear weapons capability.
An IAEA report concluded that Iran had not fully answered the international community's questions about its nuclear program and testing of new centrifuge technology for faster uranium enrichment. The report was based in part on intelligence acquired by the Bush administration that allegedly pointed to Iranian efforts to weaponize nuclear materials. The data was extracted from a laptop reportedly smuggled out of Iran in 2004.
The U.N. Security Council approved Resolution 1803, imposing further economic sanctions on Iran.
The Bush administration agreed to send U.S. Undersecretary of State William Burns to Geneva to participate with his European counterparts in talks with Iran about its nuclear program. But Iran again rejected the suspension or freeze of its enrichment activities.
The U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1835 which reaffirmed three earlier rounds of sanctions against Iran. No new sanctions were imposed, largely because of objections by Russia and China.
President Obama, French President Sarkozy and British Prime Minister Brown told a press conference that Iran had a covert fuel enrichment plant near Qom. Iran said it had already confirmed the construction of a new pilot enrichment plant to the IAEA in a letter four days earlier. Critics said Tehran disclosed the site once it discovered the facility was already under surveillance.
Iran met in Geneva with permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany to discuss Iran's nuclear program. The parties outlined a proposal for Iran to ship 80 percent of its stockpile of low-enriched uranium from Natanz to Russia. The shipment would then go to France for further enrichment and fabrication of fuel rods for the Tehran Research Reactor, which produced isotopes for medical use.
The early October talks in Geneva were continued in Vienna with the presence of the IAEA, on the transfer of Iran’s low-enriched uranium. A consensus was reached on a draft agreement. The United States, France and Russia approved the agreement, but Iran backed down due to domestic opposition.
P5+1 talks in Istanbul failed after Tehran refused to discuss transparent limits on its uranium enrichment program.
President Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had produced 20 percent enriched uranium, up from 3.5 percent, in a move that marked a major increase in its capabilities. He said Iran had the capability to enrich the fuel even further.
Turkey, Brazil and Iran agreed to a nuclear deal similar to the agreement outlined in Geneva in 2009. The proposal called for the transfer of 1,200 kg of low-enriched uranium (3.5 percent) to Turkey, in exchange for 120 kg of 20 percent enriched uranium needed to run the Tehran Research Reactor. The United States and Europeans rejected the deal because Iran had increased its uranium stockpile. The 1,200 kg then represented only about half of Iran’s stockpile, rather than the 80 percent it had in the October 2009 deal. Washington also believed the move was a delaying tactic to avert sanctions.
The Stuxnet computer virus was reportedly detected in staff computers at the Bushehr nuclear plant.
The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1929, imposing a fourth round of sanctions on Iran. They included tighter financial measures and an expanded arms embargo. President Ahmadinejad said the sanctions were a "used handkerchief that should be thrown in the dustbin," and that they were "not capable of harming Iranians."
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
Congress approved the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010. It passed unanimously in the Senate and overwhelmingly in the House. The bill expanded existing U.S. sanctions on Iran. It imposed extensive sanctions on foreign companies that export refined petroleum to Iran or invest in Iran’s energy sector. The legislation went well beyond U.N. Resolution 1929.
Iran announced that talks with U.N. Security Council and Germany could begin in September.
Iran announced it had produced 20 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium and had begun work on fuel plates. The fuel was to be delivered to the Tehran Research Reactor by September 2011, for creating medical isotopes. Western powers have repeatedly expressed fear that Iran’s capability to enrich 20 percent would help it produce nuclear weapon material, which is around 90 percent.
The European Union passed sanctions, which banned technical assistance to Iran’s oil and gas industry.
The Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom) announced that the first reactor at the Bushehr would soon be loaded with nuclear fuel and become Iran’s first operational nuclear power plant.
An official launch ceremony was held to mark completion of the Bushehr reactor, after years of delays. Iran began loading the plant with fuel, in hopes of making it fully operational within a few months. As part of the deal, Russia supplied the reactor with fuel and Iran is required to send back the spent fuel to Russia.
An IAEA report showed that Iran stopped uranium enrichment for one day on Nov. 16, 2010 with no reasoning provided. This report came amid speculation that Iran’s nuclear program had suffered technical problems.
Iran began producing its own yellowcake, which is necessary for the production of nuclear reactor fuel. Sale of yellowcake to Iran is banned under U.N. sanctions.
Iran met in Geneva with members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany for negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program. The group agreed to meet again in January 2011 in Istanbul.
Nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi claimed that Iran had the necessary technology to make fuel plates and rods for its nuclear reactors.
P5+1 talks in Istanbul failed after Tehran refused to discuss transparent limits on its uranium enrichment program.
An IAEA report found new information suggesting that Iran may have worked on nuclear weapons research. It also noted that Iran appeared to have overcome setbacks from the Stuxnet virus.
Iran’s Bushehr nuclear power plant began operating at a low level, according to the Russian company that built it, Atomstroyexport.
The E.U. imposed sanctions on more than 100 individuals and companies tied to Iran's nuclear program while the United States sanctioned seven foreign companies involved in supplying Iran with refined oil. It also blacklisted sixteen firms and individuals involved in the missile and nuclear programs.
An IAEA report found that Iran had significantly increased its low-enriched uranium production and slightly increased its number of centrifuges.
An IAEA report found that Iran had not suspended its uranium enrichment related activities and was not cooperating enough with the IAEA.
Iran announced that Bushehr nuclear power plant had been connected to the national power grid.
An IAEA report claimed that Iran had continued nuclear weaponization work since 2003 and that Iran had a secret project to enrich uranium. It also indicated that there were 8,000 centrifuges installed at Natanz, 6,200 of which were operating. Tehran claimed that the U.S. had fabricated the evidence.
The IAEA Board of Governors adopted a new resolution on the implementation of safeguards and relevant provisions of the U.N. Security Council resolutions in Iran. The resolution expressed “deep and increasing concern about the unresolved issues regarding the Iranian nuclear program, including those which need to be clarified to exclude the existence of possible military dimensions.”
Iran’s nuclear agency reported that Iranian scientists have produced their first nuclear fuel rod.
The IAEA confirmed that Iran has begun enriching uranium at its underground plant at Fordow to 20 percent.
The European Union imposed an oil embargo on Iran, effective July 1, 2012. The European Union made up 20 percent of Iran’s oil sales.
In a live television broadcast, President Ahmadinejad unveiled Iran’s first domestically produced batch of 20-percent enriched nuclear uranium for Tehran's research reactor. Iran also activated a new generation of centrifuges that reportedly increased its enrichment capacity threefold.
IAEA inspectors left Iran after being denied access to the Parchin military base.
An IAEA report found that Iran has significantly stepped up its uranium enrichment program. The IAEA expressed “serious concerns” about potential military uses.
The P5+1 agreed to resume talks with Iran over its nuclear program.
The P5+1 met in Istanbul to discuss Tehran's promised “new initiatives” on its nuclear program.
The P5+1 held inconclusive talks with Iran in Baghdad.
An IAEA report stated that inspectors found traces of uranium enriched to 27 percent at Fordow. It concluded that Iran is “unable to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.”
Iran acknowledged that the Flame computer virus had infiltrated its computer system.
The P5+1 held inconclusive talks with Iran in Moscow.
The United States announced broad new sanctions on Iranian front companies and banks linked to the proliferation of nuclear and missiles programs.
An IAEA report found that Iran had doubled its production capacity at Fordow. It warned that Iran had “sanitized” a suspect site at the Parchin military complex in ways that “significantly hampered” the agency’s investigation into past activities.
The European Union targeted Iran’s nuclear program with new sanctions on its financial, energy, trade, and transport sectors.
IAEA chief Yukiya Amano announced that his agency “cannot conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.” Talks between Tehran and the IAEA since November 2011 had not delivered “concrete results,” he said in an annual report to U.N. General Assembly.
An IAEA report found that Iran was continuing to enrich uranium, upgrade its facilities and build a heavy water reactor. Since the last quarterly report, Tehran has added 43 kilograms of 20 percent-enriched uranium to its stockpile.
The U.S. Treasury and State Department imposed sanctions on seven Iranian companies and five individuals for “proliferating weapons of mass destruction” pursuant to Executive Order 13382.
The U.S. Treasury Department froze the assets of four Iranian companies and one executive for links to Tehran’s missile and nuclear programs.
The IAEA held talks with Tehran over allegations that tests had been carried out for atomic weapons triggers, but failed to produce an agreement.
Vice President Joe Biden said that the United States is prepared to hold direct talks with Iran to resolve tensions over its controversial nuclear program.
The U.S. Treasury Department imposed new sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran and other financial institutions to restrict Tehran’s ability to spend oil revenues. It also designated one individual and four entities for involvement in censorship activities.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei rejected the offer by Vice President Biden for direct talks. “Some naïve people like the idea of negotiating with America. However, negotiations will not solve the problem,” he said in a speech to Iranian Air Force commanders.
IAEA experts met in Tehran but failed to finalize an agreement that would allow inspectors to investigate nuclear and military facilities.
Diplomats from P5+1 countries met with their Iranian counterparts in Almaty, Kazakhstan and agreed to have two more meetings later that spring.
The U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned a Greek businessman and 14 companies for helping Iran evade international oil sanctions.
Iran reported that it had begun mining uranium at two locations and started operations at an ore-processing plant.
Diplomats from P5+1 countries met with their Iranian counterparts in Almaty, Kazakhstan but the talks end without an accord or plans for another meeting. Tehran introduced a proposal requiring world powers to recognize its right to enrich uranium.
The IAEA reported that Iran had continued installation of advanced IR-2m centrifuges that could significantly upgrade its enrichment capabilities.
The United States imposed sanctions for the first time on Iran’s currency, the rial. The executive order’s objective was to render the currency unusable outside of Iran, a senior administration official said during a conference call.
The United States sanctioned a major network of front companies for hiding assets on behalf of Iranian leaders.
The Group of Eight industrialized nations called on Iran to move “without delay” to fulfill its long-delayed obligations in answering questions about its controversial nuclear program. It also called on the international community to fully implement a several U.N. sanctions resolutions designed to pressure Tehran into compliance.
New U.S. sanctions banning gold sales and trade in gold with Iran went into effect.
The IAEA reported that Iran had made slow but steady progress on its nuclear program since May. Iran continued to install centrifuges but only added a small amount of 20-percent low enriched uranium to its stockpile, which was not sufficient for one bomb’s worth of fuel.
Foreign ministers from P5+1 countries and Iran met on the sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly and agreed to hold a new round of talks in Geneva.
President Barack Obama called Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in what was the first direct communication between a U.S. and Iranian presidents since the 1979 revolution. “The two of us discussed our ongoing efforts to reach an agreement over Iran’s nuclear program,” Obama said at a White House briefing.
Diplomats from P5+1 countries and Iran met in Geneva to solve the nuclear dispute. They committed to meeting in November to continue talks that were “substantive and forward looking.”
The IAEA held talks with Iran on outstanding issues regarding its nuclear program. Iran “presented a proposal on practical measures as a constructive contribution” to ongoing talks,” according to a joint statement. The sides agreed to meet again November.
Iran and the P5+1 made significant headway but ultimately failed to finalize an agreement. Foreign ministers rushed to Geneva as a breakthrough appeared imminent. But last-minute differences, reportedly spurred by French demands for tougher terms, blocked a deal.
IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano visited Tehran. He and Iran’s chief of the Atomic Energy Organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, signed a Framework for Cooperation Agreement committing Tehran to take practical steps towards transparency within three months.
Iran and the P5+1 reached an interim agreement that would significantly constrain Tehran’s nuclear program for six months in exchange for modest sanctions relief. Iran pledged to neutralize its stockpile of near-20 percent enriched uranium, halt enrichment above five percent and stop installing centrifuges. Tehran also committed to halt construction of the Arak heavy water reactor.
The P5+1 and Iran met in Geneva at the technical level to discuss implementation of the interim nuclear deal.
Iran and the IAEA met in Vienna to review the status of the six actions Iran committed to in November as part of the Framework for Cooperation Agreement.
Nuclear and sanctions experts from Iran and the P5+1 met in Vienna to discuss technical details related to implementing the interim nuclear agreement. The Iranian team unexpectedly flew back to Tehran, reportedly in response to Washington’s blacklisting of 19 entities for violating sanctions.
The P5+1 and Iran met in Geneva and reach an agreement on implementation. The delegations returned to their capitals for approval. On January 12, the parties announced that the Joint Plan of Action will be implemented starting on January 20.
Jan. 20 – The Joint Plan of Action entered into force. The IAEA also issued a report stating that Iran is complying with the deal after reducing their 20% enrichment stockpile and halting work on the Arak heavy water reactor. The United States and European Union announced they have taken steps to waive certain sanctions and release a schedule for releasing Iran’s oil money frozen in other countries.
The project gained momentum following the Ankara Declaration, adopted on 29 October 1998 by President of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev, President of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze, President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Turkey Süleyman Demirel, and President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov. The declaration was witnessed by the United States Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson, who expressed strong support for the pipeline. The intergovernmental agreement in support of the pipeline was signed by Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey on 18 November 1999, during a meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, Turkey.
According to Maloney the US heavily advocated for this project because of its unofficial policies to prevent pipelines going through either Russia or Iran. "...These policies did more than advantage a competitor, Turkey; they deprived Iran of a central role as the transit route for Central Asian and Caucasian energy supplies."
Source: Maloney, PE, pg. 451
On 24 May, Israel announced that it would withdraw all troops from South Lebanon. All Israeli forces had withdrawn from Lebanon by the end of the next day, more than six weeks before its stated deadline of 7 July.
Pumping of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline began on 10 May 2005 and reached Ceyhan on 28 May 2006. The first oil was loaded at the Ceyhan Marine Terminal (Haydar Aliyev Terminal) onto a tanker named British Hawthorn. The tanker sailed on 4 June 2006 with about 600,000 barrels (95,000 m3) of crude oil.
The 2006 Lebanon War, also called the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah War and known in Lebanon as the July War4 and in Israel as the Second Lebanon War (Hebrew: מלחמת לבנון השנייה, Milhemet Levanon HaShniya), was a 34-day military conflict in Lebanon, northern Israel and the Golan Heights. The principal parties were Hezbollah paramilitary forces and the Israeli military. The conflict started on 12 July 2006, and continued until a United Nations-brokered ceasefire went into effect in the morning on 14 August 2006, though it formally ended on 8 September 2006 when Israel lifted its naval blockade of Lebanon. Due to unprecedented Iranian military support to Hezbollah before and during the war, some consider it the first round of the Iran–Israel proxy conflict, rather than a continuation of the Arab–Israeli conflict.
Source: Wiki: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_Lebanon_War
Completion of Israel's unilateral disengagement plan. Israel removed all Jewish settlements, many Bedouin communities, and military equipment from the Gaza Strip. Although there was no permanent Israeli presence or jurisdiction in Gaza anymore, Israel retained control of certain elements (such as airspace, borders and ports), leading to an ongoing dispute as to whether Gaza is "occupied" or not. Since the disengagement, Palestinian militant groups have used the territory as a staging ground from which to launch rocket attacks and build underground tunnels into Israel.
"American firms were purchasing as much as 25 percent of Iran's exports by 1994."
Source: Maloney, PE 450
"Prohibits US companies from investing in Iran's energy sector."
Source: Maloney, pg. 452
"... Extends US sanctions to a wide-ranging ban on all exports of goods and services to Iran, as well as investment..."
Source: Maloney, PE, Pg. 452
"The move took a toll; Shell subsequently dropped out of a revived bid process, and the black market rate for the Iranian currency crashed from 2,500 to the dollar in January 1995 to 4,300 to the dollar by April and 6,500 to the dollar in May 1995.
"The currency would never again recover its value, as future rounds of sanctions depressed its value even more dramatically."
Source: Maloney, PE, Pg. 453
"...revoking sovereign immunity for designated state sponsors of terrorism. The law facilitated a tidal wave of successful lawsuits against Iran, beginning in 1998 with a $247 million judgement against Tehran."
Source: Maloney, PE pg. 456
"...The law threatened penalties on third countries that invested more than $20 million in Iran's energy sector. Not surprisingly, the measure generated backlash among Washington's allies, with formal protests from Europe and Asia and a French Decision to reinstate export credits to Tehran, among other rebuffs."
Source: Maloney, PE, p. 454
"In 1997, only months after Khatami's election, the State Department formally designated the Mojahideen-e Khalq as a foreign terrorist organization, a move that blocked the group from fund-raising openly in the United States."
Source: Maloney, PE, p. 456
"The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 was signed into law on March 14, 2000. The act authorizes the President of the United States to take punitive action against individuals or organizations known to be providing material aid to weapons of mass destruction programs in Iran."
Source: DOS; http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c15234.htm
The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 is a United States Act of Congress signed into law by President Bill Clinton on March 14, 2000. The act authorizes the President of the United States to take punitive action against individuals or organizations known to be providing material aid to weapons of mass destruction programs in Iran.